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I. INTRODUCTION
Securing the United States from foreign threats is one of the single
most important functions of government. The Department of Defense,
tasked with the security of our Nation, is the largest government agency
both by headcount and budget.1 And while many of these resources go
* J.D., Cornell Law School, 2014. I would like to thank Professor Junewicz for his insight and
guidance throughout the writing of this Article. I am also extremely grateful for the hard work and
dedication of the editors of the University of Cincinnati Law Review, especially Executive Editor
Elizabeth Thoman. Finally, I would like to thank Jade Harry for her unwavering love and support.
1. The Department Defense has over 1.3 million active service members, 700,000 civilian
employees, and an annual budget of more than $500 billion. See The Executive Branch,
WHITEHOUSE.GOV, http://www.whitehouse.gov/our-government/executive-branch (last visited May 28,
2015); OFFICE OF THE UNDERSECRETARY OF DEF., UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE FISCAL
YEAR 2014 BUDGET REQUEST 1-3 (2013), available at http://comptroller.defense.gov/Portals/
45/Documents/defbudget/fy2014/FY2014_Budget_Request_Overview_Book.pdf. The Department of
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towards the defense of U.S. interests abroad, a large part of securing our
Nation from foreign threats occurs domestically, protecting valuable
U.S. assets such as classified information and strategic resources.
One potential source of such threats arises from foreign corporations’
growing access to classified information and strategic resources. To
counteract this threat, the U.S. has relied on a patchwork of laws and
regulations controlling foreign participation in U.S. commerce
domestically. In some instances, foreign corporations are completely
prohibited from engaging in certain commercial ventures. In most
cases, however, access to classified information or strategic resources—
such as through a foreign corporation’s acquisition of a domestic
company—is reviewed on a case-by-case basis, under which the foreign
corporation’s activities are scrutinized for potential threats. In addition,
corporations that contract with the U.S. government must comply with
specific regulations aimed at protecting classified information.
Navigating the tangled web of laws and regulations controlling
foreign access to domestic markets is complicated even for the most
sophisticated companies. More troubling, the realities of today’s global
marketplace suggest that the current laws are also impractical, unfair,
and fundamentally at odds with our notion of a free market. Indeed, the
breadth and arbitrary application of the current laws often result in
unfair and unpredictable outcomes. A new approach is necessary; one
that secures the Nation from foreign threats while also upholding the
principles of the free market.
This Article attempts to unravel the laws and regulations that impede
foreign corporations from accessing U.S. markets. Part II identifies
several laws and regulations that impact foreign investment
domestically, and identifies several contemporary applications of these
laws demonstrating how they work in practice. Part III outlines three
major critiques of the current laws, largely focusing on the anachronistic
and unfair nature of their application. Part IV presents a multi-prong
reform strategy that attempts to balance national security interests with
the promotion of foreign investment.
II. THE LEGAL AND REGULATORY CLIMATE
The current regulatory landscape is a product of years of patchwork
legislation by Congress and the President—a web of interlaced statutes,
Defense budget grew exponentially after the terrorist attack on September 11, 2001, increasing from
$287.4 billion in 2001 to $529.9 billion in 2012. See id. The Department of Defense’s annual budget is
equal to nearly twenty-five percent of total government spending. See Shan Carter & Amanda Cox,
Obama’s 2011 Budget Proposal: How It’s Spent, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 1, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/
interactive/2010/02/01/us/budget.html.
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executive orders, and regulations that aim to limit or restrict foreign
participation in certain industries. This approach is far from uniform,
and the government has relied on everything from agency approval of
foreign investment to outright prohibition. Ultimately, these laws and
regulations target every aspect of foreign investment in commerce from
production to exportation of goods. What follows is a discussion of
those laws and regulations as well as recent examples of their
application.
A.

National Industrial Security Program
1. Current Law

In 1993, President George H.W. Bush established the National
Industrial Security Program (NISP) to “serve as a single, integrated,
cohesive industrial security program to protect classified information
and to preserve our Nation's economic and technological interests.”2
The NISP has integrated the security clearance process for “military
services, Defense Agencies, 27 federal agencies and approximately
13,500 cleared contractor facilities.”3
The origin of the NISP can be traced back to the Cold War when, in
1960, President Eisenhower signed Executive Order 10865 directing the
Department of Defense to create regulations to protect national security
information that was available to corporations in the United States. 4 In
response, the Defense Department instituted the Defense Industrial
Security Program to establish guidelines by which national security
secrets may be disclosed to U.S. corporations.5 Each subsequent
President signed executive orders similar to President Eisenhower’s
Order “extend[ing] and defin[ing] the relationship between the executive
and private companies,”6 which ultimately culminated in President
Bush’s establishment of the NISP in 1993.
In conjunction with the NISP, President Bush ordered the

2. See Exec. Order No. 12829, 58 Fed. Reg. 3479 (Jan. 6, 1993). The Order was amended
slightly and signed by President Clinton less than a year later. See Exec. Order No. 12885, 58 Fed. Reg.
65863 (Dec. 14, 1993).
3. About Us, DEF. SEC. SERV., http://www.dss.mil/about_dss/index.html (last visited May 28,
2015).
4. Exec. Order No. 10865, § (1)(a)-(b), 25 Fed. Reg. 1583 (Feb. 20, 1960).
5. See DEP’T OF DEF., DIRECTIVE 5220.22-R, INDUSTRIAL SECURITY REGULATION 14 (1985),
available at http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/522022r.pdf (“The objective of the
Department of Defense Industrial Security Program is to ensure the safeguarding of classified
information in the hands of U.S. industrial organizations, educational institutions, and all organizations
and facilities used by prime and subcontractors . . . .”).
6. Laura K. Donohue, The Shadow of State Secrets, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 77, 93 (2010).
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promulgation of the National Industrial Security Program Operating
Manual (NISPOM) to “prescribe specific requirements, restrictions, and
other safeguards that are necessary to preclude unauthorized disclosure
and control authorized disclosure of classified information to
contractors, licensees, or grantees.”7 The NISPOM “controls the
authorized disclosure of classified information released by U.S.
Government Executive Branch Departments and Agencies to their
contractors.”8 It applies to all executive branch agencies and “all
cleared contractor facilities.”9 As the name implies, the NISPOM serves
as an implementing tool for the NISP. While the NISP calls for the
integration of national security measures across executive agencies, the
NISPOM sets forth unified rules and practices for which agencies and
contractors must abide.10
The NISP and NISPOM only regulate the disclosure of information
that is deemed “classified”, as that term is defined by executive order.11
Classified information can fall within one of three categories: “top
secret,” “secret,” or “confidential.”12 Information is categorized based
on the impact that the disclosure of that information would have if made
public. Information is categorized as “top secret” if the disclosure of
that information “reasonably could be expected to cause exceptionally
grave damage to the national security.” 13 Information is deemed
“secret” if the disclosure of that information “reasonably could be
expected to cause serious damage to the national security.” 14
Information is “confidential” if the disclosure of the information
“reasonably could be expected to cause damage to the national
security.”15
7. See Exec. Order No. 12829, 58 Fed. Reg. 3479, at § 201(b).
8. See DEP’T OF DEF., DIRECTIVE 5220.22-M, NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL SECURITY PROGRAM:
OPERATING
MANUAL
§ 1-100
(2006),
available
at
http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/522022m.pdf [hereinafter DEP’T OF DEF. DIRECTIVE].
9. Id. § 1-102.
10. See id. § 1-100 (“This Manual is issued in accordance with the National Industrial Security
Program (NISP). It prescribes the requirements, restrictions, and other safeguards to prevent
unauthorized disclosure of classified information.”).
11. Since the establishment of the NISP, the Executive Order governing classification of
information has been amended several times. When NISP was first established, it provided protection
of information as classified by Executive Order No. 12356. See Exec. Order 12829, 58 Fed. Reg. 3479,
at § 101(b). The classification system was amended by President Bill Clinton, President George W.
Bush, and most recently by President Barack Obama. See Exec. Order No. 12958, 60 Fed. Reg. 19825
(April 17, 1995); Exec. Order No. 13292, 68 Fed. Reg. 15315 (March 25, 2003); Exec. Order No.
13526, 75 Fed. Reg. 707 (Dec. 29, 2009).
12. See Exec. Order No. 13526, 75 Fed. Reg. 707, at § 1.2.
13. Id. § 1.2(a)(1).
14. Id. § 1.2(a)(2).
15. Id. § 1.2(a)(3). For more information regarding clearance levels, see generally Facility
Clearance Process FAQs, DEF. SEC. SERV., http://www.dss.mil/isp/fac_clear/per_sec_clear_
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The government relies on this hierarchical classification system to
prioritize the importance of classified information. While the exact
contours of each category of classified information are not clearly
defined, the Executive Branch has provided some guidance on each
category. For example, information concerning “armed hostilities
against the United States or its allies; disruption of foreign relations
vitally affecting the national security [or] the compromise of vital
national defense plans of complex cryptologic and communication
intelligence systems” could cause exceptionally grave damage to
national security and should be classified as “top secret.” 16 However, to
avoid abuse of this classification, the top-secret classification should be
used with the “utmost restraint.”17 Comparatively, information that
concerns “disruption of foreign relations significantly affecting the
national security [or] significant impairment of a program or policy
directly related to the national security” could cause serious damage to
national security and thus should be classified as “secret.” 18 This
designation too, should only be used sparingly to avoid abuse. Finally,
examples of information that could be expected to cause damage to the
national security and thus labeled as “confidential” include information
“that indicates strength of ground, air, and naval forces in the United
States and overseas areas; disclosure of technical information used for
training, maintenance, and inspection of classified munitions of war;
revelation of performance characteristics, test data, design, and
production data on munitions of war.”19
For a private contractor to access classified information, the NISPOM
requires the private contractor to be cleared, a process that has a number
of requirements. First and foremost, a contractor must be “sponsored”
by an established and trusted government contractor.20 That is, a private
contractor must rely on a previously cleared private contractor to vouch
for its reliability. In addition, the contractor must appoint one or more
U.S. citizens to serve as Facility Security Officers (FSO). 21 FSOs are
responsible for supervising and directing “security measures necessary
for implementing applicable requirements of [the NISPOM] and related
Federal requirements for classified information.”22 In essence, an FSO
proc_faqs.html (last visited May 28, 2015).
16. Exec. Order No. 11652, 37 Fed. Reg. 5209, at § 1(A) (Mar. 8, 1972).
17. Id.
18. See id. § 1(B).
19. See Department of Defense Directive 5200.1-R § 1-503 (1978).
20. Department of Defense Directive, supra note 8, § 2-102.
21. See id. § 1-201.
22. See id. § 1-201. FSOs are an integral part of implementing “FOCI mitigation agreement.”
See Facility Security Officers, DEF. SEC. SERV., http://www.dss.mil/isp/fac_clear/per_sec_clear_
proc_faqs.html (last visited May 28, 2015).
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serves as the gateway through which a contractor accesses and uses
classified information, including controlling and reporting which of the
contractor’s employees require security clearance to properly carry out
their responsibilities.23
Once cleared, contractors may only seek security clearance for those
employees that require access to classified information to perform their
duties related to the fulfillment of a classified contract.” 24 The FSO of
the cleared contractor must seek clearance for an employee from the
Cognizant Security Agency (CSA), which is one of the federal agencies
that possess the classified information.25 The scope of an employee’s
security clearance is limited to the extent it is necessary to work on the
specific project to which he or she is assigned.26 Therefore, an
employee who is cleared and currently working on one project may not
begin working on a second classified project without further clearance,
even though the employee’s contractor is completing both projects.
The government imposes a number of obligations on employees that
receive security clearance. To start, each employee has an independent
legal duty to withhold the classified information from those who do not
have security clearance. Any willful disclosure of the information could
result in criminal fines and up to ten years imprisonment. 27 Moreover,
each employee must sign a non-disclosure form prior to the government
granting clearance,28 which potentially subjects employees to additional
liability. In addition, cleared employees have an affirmative duty to
report any security discrepancies not only to their employer, but also
directly to the federal agency with whom their employer is contracted.29
Because access to classified information by foreign contractors
seemingly implicates a greater risk to national security than U.S.
contractors’ access, the NISPOM sets out additional hurdles which

23. Only employees that are absolutely necessary to carry out the functions as a government
contractor must receive security clearance. DEP’T OF DEF. DIRECTIVE, supra note 8, at § 2-200. This
can require the exclusion of the contractor’s board of directors or senior officers from classified
information, see id. at § 2-104, -106, implicating potential conflicts with director duties. Even after a
contractor obtains clearance, it is subject to continued evaluation, including constant reporting
requirements as well as ongoing training. See DEP’T OF DEF. DIRECTIVE, supra note 8, at §§ 2-300–
2-304, 3-100–3-108.
24. See id. at § 2-200(a).
25. See id. at § 2-200(b). The CSA can be one of four federal agencies: the Department of
Defense, Department of Energy, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, or the Director of National
Intelligence. See id. at § 1-104.
26. See id. at § 2-200(d). The NISPOM explicitly prohibits disclosing export-control
information and technology to foreign persons, even if they are employees. See id. at § 5-508.
27. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 793(d), 798 (2006).
28. See CLASSIFIED INFORMATION NONDISCLOSURE AGREEMENT (2013), available at
http://www.archives.gov/isoo/security-forms/sf312.pdf (standard form 312).
29. See DEP’T OF DEF. DIRECTIVE, supra note 8, at § 1-207.
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foreign organizations must pass before gaining access to classified
information. While the NISPOM emphasizes the importance of foreign
investment in the United States, such investment need be “consistent
with the national security interests of the United States.”30 Chapter 2,
Section 3 of the NISPOM is devoted to rules and regulations governing
companies that are under Foreign Ownership, Control, or Influence
(FOCI).31 A company will be deemed to be under FOCI whenever
“foreign interest has the power, direct or indirect . . . to direct or decide
matters affecting the management or operations of that company in a
manner which may result in unauthorized access to classified
information or may adversely affect the performance of classified
contracts.”32 A company under FOCI is presumptively ineligible for
clearance, “unless and until security measures have been put in place to
negate or mitigate FOCI.”33
Ultimately, the decision to label a company as “under FOCI,”
whether or not to grant it clearance, as well as to determine what other
security measures are to be taken is for the Department of Defense to
decide.34 The NISPOM lists several factors that are relevant for making
that decision, including the history of economic and government
espionage against the government and the type of information the
company has access to.35 Further, NISPOM establishes procedures for
companies under FOCI to create Voting Trust Agreements and Proxy
Agreements, “whereby the foreign owner relinquishes most rights
associated with ownership of the company to cleared U.S. citizens
approved by the U.S. Government.”36
2. Current Application of the NISP Regulations
The effectiveness of the NISP regulations has come under public
scrutiny recently. Due to several high-profile scandals, many question
whether the current regulations are sufficient to protect classified
government information. Interestingly, these current failures implicate

30. Id. at § 2-300(a).
31. Id. For more information defining FOCI, see Melvin Rishe, Foreign Ownership, Control, or
Influence: The Implications for United States Companies Performing Defense Contracts, 20 PUB. CONT.
L.J. 143, 162-64 (1991).
32. DEP’T OF DEF. DIRECTIVE, supra note 8, at § 2-300(b).
33. Id. at § 2-300(c).
34. The Defense Security Service offers a number of suggestions a FOCI can take to mitigate the
dangers of foreign control. They even offer templates for drafting a Board Resolution or a Special
Security Agreement. See DEFENSE SECURITY SERVICE, FOCI Mitigation Instruments (last visited Nov.
20, 2013), available at http://www.dss.mil/isp/foci/foci_mitigation.html.
35. Department of Defense Directive, supra note 8 § 2-301.
36. Id. § 2-303(b).
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domestic national security breaches rather than any international ones.
The most notable failure relates to the recent information leak by
Edward Snowden. The lack of oversight and control brought to light
several system-wide deficiencies in protecting classified information.
Edward Snowden was a high-school dropout who was able to secure
a job paying $122,000 annually with Booz-Allen-Hamilton (BAH), one
of the largest private government contractors, and gain top secret
security clearance in the process.37 After working for less than three
months, Snowden boarded a plane to Hong Kong and leaked top secret
information to U.S., British, and German press.38 The world now knows
that BAH never conducted a criminal background check on Snowden
and hired him despite discrepancies on his resume.39 In addition, the
largest provider of federal background checks, United States
Investigations Services (USIS), is currently under federal investigation
for failing to conduct proper background checks.40
Similar criticism arose from the hiring of Aaron Alexis, the ITcontractor responsible for the mass killing at the Washington Navy Yard
in September 2013. Like Snowden, Alexis was an IT employer for a
government subcontractor who was granted secret clearance. After
being discharged from the U.S. Navy and working a number of odd
jobs, Alexis went on to work at The Experts, a subcontractor of HewlettPackard (H-P) to “work on a project at the Navy facility.” 41 Less than
three months after starting his job, Alexis arrived at work and killed 12
people.
Originally from New York City and later from Fort Worth, Texas,
investigators were only able to unearth limited biographical details
about Alexis.42 The little information that was found about Alexis
revealed that he did not have a college degree and was arrested on two

37. See Dennis M. Crowley, Alexis and Snowden: Both IT Contractors, No College—But
Security Clearances, CNSNEWS.COM (Sep. 17, 2013), http://cnsnews.com/news/article/dennis-mcrowley/alexis-and-snowden-both-it-contractors-no-college-security-clearances.
38. Id.
39. See Mark Hosenball, Exclusive: NSA Contractor Hired Snowden Despite Concerns About
Resume Discrepancies, REUTERS (June 20, 2013), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/06/21/us-usasecurity-snowden-idUSBRE95K01J20130621.
40. Id.
41. See Nathan Koppel & Rebecca Ballhaus, Background Details on Suspected Shooter Aaron
Alexis,
WALL
STREET
J.
BLOGS
(Sept.
16,
2013),
http://blogs.wsj.com/washwire/2013/09/16/background-details-on-supectedshooter-aaron-alexis/; Aaron
Alexis
Biographical
Information,
CBS
DC
(Sept.
17,
2013),
http://washington.cbslocal.com/2013/09/17/aaron-alexis-biographical-information/.
42. See Navy Yard Shooting Suspect Aaron Alexis: Scant Biographical Details Emerge,
HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 17, 2013), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/09/16/navy-yard-shootingsuspect_n_3936876.html (“The 34-year-old left a scant social media footprint, though that could have
been by design.”).
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earlier occasions for gun-related offenses.43 And although Alexis was
involved in work-related discipline a few days prior to the shooting,
there is no indication that the discipline was related to the shooting.
Rather, all reports indicate that Alexis was suffering from mental or
emotional distress, as evidence appeared to indicate that “[Alexis]
thought he was being controlled by extremely low frequency
electromagnetic waves.”44
Setting recent criticisms aside, the NISP’s success with respect to
preventing foreign access to government information is difficult to
measure. According to a 2012 report, the number of individuals who
experienced significant delays in receiving security clearance due to
“foreign influence” or “questions regarding their allegiance to the U.S.”
remained rather small.45 That being said, these statistics can be
misleading as they only represent a small portion of those individuals
seeking clearance. Moreover, the statistics are difficult to interpret
considering that the single greatest reason for delay was based on
multiple issues instead of one in particular.46
B.

Defense Production Act of 1950 and Its Amendments
1. Current Law

As more foreign nations rose to global prominence in the 1970s,
Congress became increasingly concerned with the relative lack of power
the U.S. government had to review foreign transactions within the
United States. In response, President Gerald Ford created the
Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) as a
way to review foreign transactions and detect those that may be harmful
to U.S. interests.47 At the time it was created, CFIUS was comprised of
43. See Dennis M. Crowley, Alexis and Snowden: Both IT Contractors, No College—But
Security Clearances, CNS NEWS (Sep. 17, 2013), http://www.cnsnews.com/news/article/dennis-mcrowley/alexis-and-snowden-both-it-contractors-no-college-security-clearances.
44. See Ann E. Marimow & Peter Hermann, Navy Yard Shooter Aaron Alexis Driven by
Delusions, WASH. POST (Sept. 25, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/local/crime/fbi-police-detailshooting-navy-yard-shooting/2013/09/25/ee321abe-2600-11e3-b3e9-d97fb087acd6_story.html.
45. OFFICE OF THE DIRE. OF NAT’L INTELLIGENCE, 2012 REPORT ON SECURITY CLEARANCE
DETERMINATIONS 10 (2013), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/othergov/intel/clear-2012.pdf.
46. Id.
47. See Exec. Order No. 11858, 40 Fed. Reg. 20263 (May 1, 1975) (“The Committee shall have
primary continuing responsibility within the Executive Branch for monitoring the impact of foreign
investment in the United States.”). While the NISP attempts to protect government secrets from coming
under foreign control, the DPA and its progeny are largely concerned with foreign entities gaining
control over strategic U.S. interests, whether it be resources, technology, or land within the U.S. Section
2-310 of NISPOM grants review authority over mergers and acquisitions to CFIUS. See DEP’T OF DEF.
DIRECTIVE, supra note 8, at § 2-310.
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six representatives from different Executive Branch agencies, including
the Departments of Defense, State, Treasury, and Commerce.48
However, CFIUS had no authoritative power to prevent or block foreign
transactions that would have a significantly detrimental impact on the
national security of the United States. Rather, the Committee merely
“served the limited role to alert the government of potential problems
with certain transactions.”49
After more than a decade of discretionary authority, Congress passed
the Omnibus Trade and Competitive Act of 1988. 50 The Act served as a
comprehensive reform of foreign policy and expanded the executive
branch’s power to oversee foreign involvement in U.S. commerce.
Specifically, the Act amended § 721 of the Defense Production Act
(DPA),51 transforming CFIUS’s role from advisory to authoritative.
Under the new law, commonly referred to as the Exon-Florio
Amendment, CFIUS had the power not only to investigate foreign
investment, but “to block certain mergers or acquisitions for national
security reasons.”52
Even under the Exon-Florio Amendment, though, parties to a
transaction were not required to divulge an upcoming merger or
acquisition to CFIUS. Instead, CFIUS relies on the voluntary disclosure
of transactions that may implicate national security concerns. Of course,
parties to such transactions have an incentive to voluntarily disclose
transactions because the President could order a post-hoc divestiture of
the transaction if CFIUS discovers any national security concerns. 53
Upon notification of an upcoming transaction, each member of
48. Id. at § 1(a). CFIUS has expanded a number of times over the years and it is currently
comprised of 16 members, including the heads of nine executive agencies, as well as five additional
agency representatives and two non-voting members (Director of National Intelligence and the Secretary
of Labor). See Composition of CFIUS, DEPT. OF TREASURY, http://www.treasury.gov/resourcecenter/international/foreign-investment/Pages/cfius-members.aspx (last updated Dec. 1, 2010). Note that
the heads of the Executive agencies are now required to serve on CFIUS rather than designees of each
respective agency. See Exec. Order No. 12661, 54 Fed. Reg. 779 (Dec. 27, 1988).
49. Maira Goes de Moraes Gavioli, National Security or Xenophobia: The Impact of the Foreign
Investment and National Security Act (“FINSA”) in Foreign Investment in the U.S., 2 WM. MITCHELL
L. RAZA J. 1, 6 (2011).
50. Pub. L. 100-418, 102 Stat. 1107 (Aug. 23, 1988).
51. See 50 App. U.S.C. § 2170 (2013). The DPA was originally enacted in the wake of the
Korean War and the fear of spreading Communism. Under the Act, Congress granted the President
“complete power to regulate every phase of industry and commerce, through the authority to allocate
materials and facilities.” Manly Fleischmann, The Mobilization Program and the Public Interest, 100 U.
PA. L. REV. 483, 484 (1952). At the time, the DPA was considered a broad and sweeping grant of
power to the Executive Branch.
52. Matthew R. Byrne, Protecting National Security and Promoting Foreign Investment:
Maintaining the Exon-Florio Balance, 67 OHIO ST. L.J. 849, 849 (2006).
53. See 50 App. U.S.C. § 2170 (d)(3) (“The President may direct the Attorney General to seek
appropriate relief, including divestment relief, in the district courts of the United States in order to
implement and enforce this section.”).
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CFIUS conducts its own analysis of the transaction to determine
national security risks within their respective agencies.54 If each
member initially concludes that the transaction is benign, CFIUS
conducts no investigation and the transaction may proceed as planned.
However, if a national security concern is implicated, CFIUS has an
additional 45 days to conduct an investigation to determine whether the
Once
transaction could substantially impact national security. 55
presented with the investigatory findings, the President has an additional
15 days to determine whether that the transaction would “threaten to
impair the national security.” 56 If the President determines that the
transaction would impair national security, then the transaction could be
prevented. Absent such a find, the transaction may proceed.
By many accounts, the immediate impact of Exon-Florio on foreign
transactions was marginal.
Although Exon-Florio significantly
increased the number of voluntary notifications that CFIUS received,57
few notifications ended in actual investigations. From 1988 to 1994,
CFIUS investigated only 15 of the 918 transactions to which they were
notified. Further, the President ultimately blocked only one of those. 58
Perhaps motivated by the paucity of investigations, as well as several
failed foreign transactions, Congress further amended section 721 of the
DPA.
Rather than allowing CFIUS to conduct investigations at its
discretion, the Byrd Amendment, enacted in 2000, mandated
investigations in certain circumstances.
Ultimately, the Byrd
Amendment required CFIUS to conduct an investigation of any covered
transaction that involved a foreign-controlled entity seeking to acquire a
U.S. company which “could impair national security.”59
Congress made its most recent changes to CFIUS review procedures
in 2007. The Foreign Investment and National Security Act of 2007
(FINSA) was passed after public outcry over the Dubai Ports World
purchase of P&O North America, “a company running commercial
operations at five major U.S. port facilities and involved in more than a

54.
55.
56.
57.

See id.
Id.
Id.
See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE., FOREIGN INVESTMENT: IMPLEMENTATION OF EXONFLORIO
AND
RELATED
AMENDMENTS
4
(1995),
available
at
http://www.gao.gov/archive/1996/ns96012.pdf.
58. Id. In 1990, President Bush ordered Catic, “a Chinese agency that exports military and
civilian planes, to divest itself of Mamco,” an aerospace supplier based in Seattle. See Harriet King,
Chinese Ends Silence on Deal U.S. Rescinded, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 20, 1990),
http://www.nytimes.com/1990/02/20/business/china-ends-silence-on-deal-us-rescinded.html.
59. See 50 App. U.S.C. § 2170(b)(2)(B).
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dozen others.”60 FINSA further expanded CFIUS’s review and
investigatory power by allowing the Committee to consider a number of
new factors when determining whether a particular covered transaction
poses a threat to national security. Such factors include the impact the
transaction will have on critical infrastructure, the foreign entities
cooperation with U.S. treaties and nonproliferation efforts, and the
United States’ long-term energy independence.61 These new factors
ultimately focus less on issues that directly implicate national security,
and instead focus on issues that can indirectly impact national security.
2. Contemporary Examples of CFIUS’s Operation
The most recent amendments of the CFIUS review process have
arguably had a significant impact on mergers and foreign investment
within the U.S. While the impact cannot be traced to any single
decision or review by CFIUS, the threat of action has served as a
powerful deterrent to foreign corporations seeking to invest in the U.S.
In the summer of 2005, China’s state-owned oil company, China
National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC), made an unsolicited bid
to acquire Unocal, an American oil producer for $18.5 billion.62
CNOOC’s bid was the highest that Unocal received, topping Chevron’s
already-accepted offer of $16.5 billion.63 But the Chinese company’s
bid came at a time of significant economic tension between China and
the U.S., particularity about the artificial devaluation of China’s
currency, as well as the unfair disparity between the two countries’ trade
laws. CNOOC’s attempt to purchase a century-old U.S. company was
the proverbial straw that broke the camel’s back. Despite testimony
warning of “isolationist trade policies,”64 a number of congressmen

60. See Jonathan C. Stagg, Scrutinizing Foreign Investment: How Much Congressional
Involvement Is Too Much?, 93 IOWA L. REV. 325, 344 (2007). For more information surrounding the
public outcry which led to the passage of FINSA, see id.; Greg Hitt, Lawmakers Keep Up Pressure on
Dubai Ports Firm, WALL ST. J., Mar. 16, 2006, at A4.
61. Compare 50 App. U.S.C. § 2170 (2006) with 50 App. U.S.C. § 2170 (2013).
62. Jonathan Weisman & Peter S. Goodman, China’s Oil Bid Riles Congress, WASHINGTON
POST
(June
24,
2005),
available
at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2005/06/23/AR2005062302065.html.
63. See David Barboza & Andrew Ross Sorkin, Chinese Company Drops Bid to Buy U.S. Oil
Concern,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Aug.
3,
2005),
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/08/03/business/worldbusiness/03unocal.html?pagewanted=all&_r=1&.
64. See THEO S. EICHER ET AL., INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS 429 (7th ed. 2009) (statement by
John Snow, Secretary of the Treasury); see also U.S. – China Economic Relations: Hearing Before S.
Comm. on Fin., 109th Cong. (June 23, 2005) (statement of Sean Maloney, Executive Vice President,
Intel Corporation, on behalf of the U.S. Chambers of Commerce) (“The U.S. and China must remain
committed to resolving issue at hand without resorting to measures that will negatively impact workers
and industries on either side of the Pacific.”).

https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol83/iss4/5

12

Aglialoro: Defend and Protect: National Security Restrictions on Foreign In

2015]

DEFEND AND PROTECT

1273

proffered legislative solutions to CNOOC’s bid to acquire Unocal.65
Perhaps as a result of the tumultuous economic climate, those solutions
were more punitive than responsive, ranging from increased tariffs on
Chinese exports to new penalties for intellectual property violations by
China.66
Many in Congress claimed that a Chinese corporation’s acquisition of
a U.S. oil company posed a significant risk to a strategic asset that was
vital to U.S. interest.67
In response, Congress “demanded an
administration review of the bid, required under the DPA, to determine
potential economic and security risks.”68 Additionally, as a symbolic
gesture of protest, the House of Representatives passed a non-binding
resolution stating that CNOOC’s acquisition of Unocal “would threaten
to impair the national security of the United States.”69
During the course of Congress’s recalcitrance, CNOOC continuously
insisted on a national security review by CFIUS. 70 Despite CNOOC’s
proactive commitment to follow all procedures, Congress amended the
Energy Policy Act of 2005 to include a one-time study of China’s
energy requirements and its future impact on the United States.71 The
amendment was far from benign, and prevented CFIUS from reviewing
any Chinese corporation’s acquisition of a U.S. company until it had the
opportunity to review the report.72 Effectively, the amendment stalled
CFIUS’s review of the transaction for 141 days, an additional burden
that CNOOC could not surmount. Due to what CNOOC viewed as
“unprecedented political opposition” to its proposed transaction,
including attempts “to replace or amend the CFIUS process that has
been successfully in operation for almost two decades,” CNOOC
withdrew its bid amid the overwhelming political backlash.73
65. Weisman & Goodman, supra note 62.
66. See id.; Jad Mouawad, Congress Calls for a Review of the Chinese Bid for Unocal, N.Y.
TIMES (July 27, 2005), http://www.nytimes.com/2005/07/27/business/congress-calls-for-a-review-ofthe-chinese-bid-for-unocal.html (noting Congress’ consideration of an energy bill that would delay
CNOOC’s takeover by several months).
67. See id. (quoting Senator Byron L. Dorgan, member of the Senate’s energy committee, as
saying the CNOOC takeover of Unocal poses “a fairly significant issue and the fact is, we should deal
with this in a manner that reflects our national interest”).
68. Weisman & Goodman, supra note 62.
69. H. R. Res. 344, 109 Cong. (June 30, 2005).
70. See Dennis K. Berman, U.S. Seems Wary of Giving CNOOC Fast Review of Bid, WALL ST. J.
(June 28, 2005), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB111988482359270487; CNOOC Press Release,
CNOOC Limited to Withdraw UNOCAL Bid (Aug. 2, 2005) (on file with author) (“CNOCC initiated a
voluntary filing with CFIUS, and proactively committed to take actions with respect to Unocal's U.S.
assets as necessary to satisfy CFIUS findings.”) [hereinafter CNOOC Press Release].
71. See Energy Policy Act of 2005 § 1837(a), Pub. L. No. 109-58, 119 Stat. 594 (2005); GARY
CLYDE HUFBAUER, ET AL., US-CHINA TRADE DISPUTES: RISING TIDE, RISING STAKES 48 (2006).
72. See Energy Policy Act of 2005 § 1837(c).
73. See CNOOC Press Release, supra note 70. Although CNOOC was seemingly willing to
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A more recent example that directly involved CFIUS review and
ultimately concluded in an order of divestiture occurred in September
2012. Sany Group, a Chinese investment company acquired a wind
farm in Oregon through its subsidiary, Ralls Corporation. Ralls
purchased the wind farm in March 2012, but failed to report the
acquisition to CFIUS until after the completion of the acquisition.74
When CFIUS members discovered the acquisition in June 2012, they
contacted Ralls and asked them to voluntarily submit to a retroactive
review of their acquisition of the wind farm.75 After an initial review,
CFIUS requested that Ralls cease all activity on the wind farm so that
the Committee could complete a full investigation. 76 The request was
based on the U.S. Navy’s objection that the wind farm’s close proximity
to a government training facility posed a significant risk to national
security.77
Upon the completion of the investigation, CFIUS
recommended to the President that Ralls divest itself of the wind farm. 78
For the first time in 22 years, the President ordered a complete
divestiture.79
raise their bid price to $20 billion, CNOOC believed that their acquisition would not be approved no
matter what price they offered. See id.
74. Ralls Corp. v. Comm. on Foreign Inv. in the United States, 926 F. Supp. 2d 71, 77–79
(D.D.C. 2013). As discussed above, reporting to CFIUS is on a voluntary basis. Failure to do so does
not present any direct consequences. As occurred here, however, an adverse finding by CFIUS can
result in an order of divestiture from the President.
75. See JAMES K. JACKSON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33388, THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN
INVESTMENT IN THE UNITED STATES (CFIUS) 10 (2014).
76. See id.
77. See id.; Helene Cooper, Obama Orders Chinese Company to End Investment at Sites Near
Drone Base, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 29, 2012, at A16.
78. See Cooper, supra note 77.
79. See Order of September 28, 2012, Regarding the Acquisition of Four U.S. Wind Farm
Project Companies by Ralls Corporation, 77 Fed. Reg. 60281 (Oct. 3, 2012). Ralls Corp. challenged
the President’s order contending, among other things, that Exon-Florio and its progeny do not give the
President the authority to order divestment after the completion of a covered transaction. See Ralls
Corp., 926 F. Supp. at 88 (“So plaintiff's entire ultra vires claim is premised upon the notion that the
only thing the statute permits the President to do is to suspend or prohibit a transaction.”). Initially, the
district court allowed Ralls Corp. to continue with its due process challenging the President’s ability to
deprive Ralls of property without opportunity to be heard, while dismissing the remainder of Ralls
Corp.’s other claims based on the President’s broad authority to not only suspend or prohibit
transactions but also to order divestiture after the fact. See id. at 99-100. In a subsequent order,
however, the district court dismissed Rall’s remaining due process claim, holding that the President’s
order of divestiture did not deprive Ralls of a constitutionally protected property interest because Ralls
“voluntarily acquired those state property rights subject to the known risk of a Presidential veto.” Ralls
Corp. v. Comm. on Foreign Inv. in the United States, 987 F. Supp. 2d 18, 27 (D.D.C. 2013). In an
unprecedented ruling, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia held that President’s order
deprived Ralls Corp. of a protected property interest without due process of law, and remanded the case
to the district court to provide Ralls Corp. with the requisite process, “which should include access to
the unclassified evidence on which the President relied and an opportunity to respond thereto.” See
Ralls Corporation v. Comm. on Foreign Investment in the United States, 758 F.3d 296, 318-321, 325
(D.C. Cir. 2014).
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C. Other Acts Restricting Foreign Investment
In addition to the statutes and regulations monitoring and restricting
foreign investment in the U.S., there are a number of federal laws that
completely prohibit foreign ownership within specific industries. These
categorical bans generally have a narrow focus based on a U.S. national
security interest.
1. Cabotage
Cabotage is the “the transport of goods or passengers from one port or
place to another in the same country.” 80 For national security reasons,
the U.S. has cabotage laws that prevent foreign companies from owning
or operating companies that transport goods or persons from one U.S.
destination to another. These prohibitions cover transportation by both
sea and air.
The Jones Act requires all vessels transporting goods by waterway
within the U.S. to be owned and operated by U.S. companies, manned
by U.S. citizens, and built and repaired in the U.S. 81 Enacted in 1920,
the Jones Act was a product of World War I and resolved two standing
issues Congress faced at the time. First, by requiring all domestic ships
to be U.S.-owned, the government created a fleet “capable of serving as
a naval and military auxiliary in time of war and national emergency.” 82
Second, at the end of World War I, the U.S. government was in
possession of more than 1,750 ships that they had either built or
confiscated for the war effort. The Jones Act created a market demand
for U.S. ships to serve the domestic economy. 83 Since its passage, the
Jones Act has been amended several times, sometimes to expand its
scope and other times to create exceptions to its application.84 In
practice, the Jones Act has effectively insulated a $40-billion industry
that employs 150,000 U.S. citizens from foreign competitors.85
In addition to controlling the waterways, the U.S. has enforced
cabotage laws for air travel. The Federal Aviation Act was enacted in
1958 to “to provide for the regulation and promotion of civil aviation in
80. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
81. See 46 U.S.C. § 50101(a) (2006); see also Wakil Oyeleru Oyedemi, Cabotage Regulations
and the Challenges of Outer Continental Shelf Development in the United States, 34 HOUS. J. INT'L L.
607, 617 (2012).
82. 46 U.S.C. § 50101(a)(2).
83. See Oyedemi, supra note 81, at 616.
84. For a in depth discussion of the Jones Act, see generally C. Todd Jones, The Practical Effects
on Labor of Repealing American Cabotage Laws, 22 TRANSP. L.J. 403, 406-12 (1995).
85. See MARITIME ADMIN., DEPT. OF TRANS., U.S. CABOTAGE LAWS (2005), available at
http://www.marad.dot.gov/documents/CabotageLaws.pdf.
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such manner as to best foster its development and safety, and to provide
for the safe and efficient use of the airspace by both civil and military
aircraft, and for other purposes.”86 To accomplish these goals, the U.S.
requires all air carriers to be owned and operated by U.S. citizens,87 with
“citizens of the U.S.” being defined as “an individual who is a citizen of
the United States,” a partnership comprised entirely of U.S. citizens, or a
U.S. corporation.88 In addition, the corporation’s president, at least twothirds of its board of directors, and at least 75 percent of its voting
interest all must be U.S. citizens.89
When compared to the cabotage laws governing U.S. waterways, the
air prohibitions are not nearly as stringent. First, the air prohibition
allows foreign corporations to own up to a 25 percent interest in air
carriers. Presumably, this means that an amalgam of foreign companies
could own up to 25 percent of Delta Airlines’ stock, for example,
whereas waterway carriers must be fully owned and operated by U.S.
citizens. Second, the Jones Act forbids foreign corporations to own or
operate any transportation between two U.S. ports, even if the ship
makes an international stop along the way. Foreign airlines, however,
“could carry the passenger from [Los Angeles] to New York if the
passenger had a through Air France ticket to Paris and, following a
stopover in New York, boarded another Air France flight to Paris.”90
2. Natural Resources
Until 1920, the U.S. government authorized citizens to claim public
lands in the west for purposes of prospecting oil.91 However, in the
midst of the oil rushes at the turn of the century, Congress and the
President feared that oil prospecting would envelop all public lands.
With the goal of preserving at least some public lands from private
claims, Congress enacted the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920, which
restricted millions of acres of public land from any further private claim
related to oil.92 Today, the General Mining Act of 1872 still allows
86. See Federal Aviation Act of 1958, P.L. 85-726, 72 Stat. 731 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 49 U.S.C.) (1958). In 1994, Congress repealed the Federal Aviation Act and
recodified existing legislation relating to transportation in Title 49. See Revision of Title 49, U.S.CA.,
“Transportation,” Pub. L. 103-272, 108 Stat. 745 (July 5, 1994).
87. See 49 U.S.C. § 40102(a)(2) (2006).
88. See id. § 40102(a)(15).
89. See id.
90. See U.S. DEPT. OF TRANS., CABOTAGE DEFINITION AND STANDARDS FOR EMERGENCY
EXEMPTION (2011), available at http://www.doi.gov/oia/igia/2011/upload/20-AviationCabotageDOT2.pdf.
91. See General Mining Act of 1872, 17 Stat. 91 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 30
U.S.C.).
92. 41 Stat. 437 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 30 U.S.C.).
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private citizens to purchase public land from the government for specific
types of prospecting,93 but the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920 governs the
disposal of land with respect to prospecting for “coal, phosphate,
sodium, potassium, oil, oil shale, gilsonite (including all vein-type solid
hydrocarbons), or gas.”94
Under both acts, only U.S. citizens may mine for minerals or drill for
oil. However, under the General Mining Act, foreign companies may
purchase land from the U.S. government so long as they have a U.S.
subsidiary incorporated under the laws of the U.S.95 This is not the case
for oil and gas. Under the Mineral Leasing Act, citizens of foreign
countries may not lease public land from the government for purposes of
prospecting for oil or gas unless that citizen’s country of origin grants
reciprocal rights to U.S. citizens.96
3. Export Control
The U.S. has always considered export control a vital part of national
security. Throughout most of U.S. history, though, the government only
sought to control exports during times of war or other crises.97 At the
start of the twentieth century, for example, the U.S. relied on the
Trading with the Enemies Act of 1917 (TWEA), which prohibited U.S.
citizens from trading directly or indirectly with enemies of the U.S.
during times of war.98
93. See 30 U.S.C. § 22 (2006). The purchase of land for prospecting is quite controversial in
itself. Since the General Mining Act was enacted, the price the government charged per acre has not
changed and citizens can still purchase public land from the government at the price of five dollars per
acre. See id. § 29. Each attempt to reform the Act has failed. 145 Cong. Rec. E67-01 (daily ed. Jan. 19,
1999) (statement of Cong. Nick J. Rahill II) (“The bill we are introducing today is the very same which
passed the House of Representatives by a three-to-one margin during the 103rd Congress[, but failed to
pass the Senate]. Reintroduced during the 104th and 105th Congresses, it was held hostage by the
Resources Committee.”); see also Unnecessary Business Subsidies: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on
the Budget, 106th Cong. 173 (1999) (testimony of Ralph Nader) (“No discussion of government
giveaways can fail to take note of the absurd Mining Act of 1872. . . . The reason is simple: the Act
allows companies to purchase Federal land for $5 an acre or less and to mine valuable mineral from
Federal land without paying a cent in royalties.”).
94. 30 U.S.C. § 181.
95. See id. § 24 (“Proof of citizenship . . . may consist, . . . in the case of a corporation organized
under the laws of the United States, or of any State or Territory thereof, by the filing of a certified copy
of their charter or certificate of incorporation.”).
96. See id. § 181.
97. See Harold J. Berman & John R. Garson, United States Export Controls- Past, Present, and
Future, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 791, 791 (1967) (“Traditionally, the United States Government has
restricted exports only in time of war or in special emergency situations.”).
98. See 50 App. U.S.C. § 1-39, 41, 44 (2013). Today, the TWEA has very little practical impact
as it only lists Cuba as an enemy of the U.S. And while President Obama renewed TWEA restrictions
against Cuba in 2014, see Presidential Determination – Trading with the Enemy Act,
WHITEHOUSE.GOV, https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/09/05/presidential-determination
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Around the start of Cold War, however, Congress enacted the Export
Control Act of 1949 (ECA),99 which “was a formal recognition of the
new security threat and of the need for an extensive peacetime export
control system.”100 The reasons for imposing the first ever peacetime
export controls were threefold: (1) to prevent the export of scarce goods
that could impact the U.S; (2) to promote foreign policy goals, including
“regional stability, human rights, anti-terrorism, missile technology, and
chemical and biological warfare;” and (3) to protect national security.101
Under the ECA, the President was empowered to “‘prohibit or curtail
the exportation from the United States . . . of any articles . . . except
under such rules as he shall prescribe.’”102 This broad grant of power
was initially intended as a short-term solution to, among other things,
supply shortages after the war;103 however, the ECA was renewed on
several occasions thereafter.104 Ultimately, the President exercised near
complete authority to control most of foreign trade for 20 years. Not
only did the President have the power to invoke the TWEA under the
ECA,105 but the Departments of Commerce, State, and Treasury each
had a hand in implementing and drafting regulations that defined the
boundaries of the Act.106
In 1969, Congress replaced the ECA and adopted the Export
Administration Act (EAA),107 representing a major shift in policy
towards export controls. Though the ECA represented something of a
presumption against trade, the EAA actively encouraged it, “unless it
was detrimental to the national interest, national security, or domestic
-trading-enemy-act (last visited June 16, 2015), the recent relaxation of sanctions against Cuba raises the
possibility that Cuba will also be de-designated an enemy of the United States. Ultimately, the President
has the power to control which country is designated an “enemy.” See 50 App. U.S.C. § 2 (2013).
99. Pub. L. No. 81-11, 63 Stat. 7 (1949).
100. IAN F. FERGUSSON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL31832, THE EXPORT ADMINISTRATION ACT:
EVOLUTION, PROVISIONS, AND DEBATE 2 (2009).
101. Id.
102. Paul H. Siverstone, The Export Control Act of 1949:Extraterritorial Enforcement, 107 U. PA.
L. REV. 331, 332 (1959) (quoting Export Control Act of 1949 § 3(a), 63 Stat. 7 (1949)). Such broad
power, however, was only “intended as a temporary measure that would give the president substantial
powers to deal with the post-World War II security threat.” See Matthew J. Peed, Blacklisting As
Foreign Policy: The Politics and Law of Listing Terror States, 54 DUKE L.J. 1321, 1324 (2005).
103. See Berman & Garson, supra note 97, at 794–99 (recounting the history behind the passage
of the Export Control Act and recounting the reasons given by Congress and the President for the need
for peacetime export controls); Silverstone, supra note 102, at 332.
104. Berman & Garson, supra note 97, at 792 (“The Export Control Act was renewed in 1951,
and again in 1953, 1956, 1958, 1960, 1962, and 1965.”).
105. See 50 App. U.S.C. § 2 (2013); Berman & Garson, supra note 97, at 792.
106. See Berman & Garson, supra note 97, at 792–94 (“Probably no single piece of legislation
gives more power to the President to control American commerce.”); Silverstone, supra note 102, at
332–33.
107. Pub. L. 91-184, 83 Stat. 841 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 50 U.S.C.); See
FERGUSSON supra note 100, at 2.
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economy.”108 The law was largely rewritten in 1979, but the policy of
encouraging trade remained the same. The 1979 version “forms the
basis of the export control system today.” 109
Export controls today operate along two axes: types of goods and
categories of countries. At one extreme, the U.S. has prohibited U.S.
companies from exporting nearly all goods to a small list of countries.110
In the majority of cases, however, where certain types of goods can be
exported largely depends on the relationship the U.S. has with each
country.
With respect to national security, the Department of Commerce has
designated specific countries to which U.S. companies are prohibited
from exporting goods or technology, if the goods or technology
significantly contribute to the country’s military capabilities.111
Regardless of whether a country appears on the designated list, though,
U.S. companies must receive export licenses to export certain goods to
any foreign country. The type of goods that require export licenses are
listed on the Commercial Control List (CCL), and include exports that
the Department of Commerce deem vital to the U.S. for “national
security, foreign policy, and short-supply purposes.”112 These products
range from nuclear materials and toxins to computers and electronics,113
all of which the Department of Commerce has concluded could have a
detrimental impact on the U.S. if they inadvertently ended up in the
wrong hands.114
In addition, the Department of State administers the International
Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) pursuant to the Arms Export and
108. Scott L. Eisenstein, The Export Administration Act Comes Under Fire: Can We Balance
National Security and an Expanding High Technology Market?, 4 INT'L LEGAL PERSP. 73, 76 (1992).
109. See FERGUSSON supra note 100, at 2. The EAA officially expired in the early 1990’s;
however, each President since its expiration has extended the Act’s efficacy under the International
Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA). See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 13222, 67 Fed. Reg. 44,025
(Aug. 17, 2001). President Barack Obama has made several amendments to Exec. Order No. 13222.
See Press Release, Office of the Press Secretary, White House, Fact Sheet: Implementation of Export
Control Reform (Mar. 8, 2013), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-pressoffice/2013/03/08/fact-sheet-implementation-export-control-reform.
110. Countries that have “repeatedly provided state support for acts of international terrorism” are
designated as state sponsors of terrorism by the Department of State. See Meredith Rathbone et al.,
Sanctions, Sanctions Everywhere: Forging A Path Through Complex Transnational Sanctions Laws, 44
GEO. J. INT'L L. 1055, 1067 (2013) (citation omitted). The countries currently designated as state
sponsors of terrorism are Iran, Sudan, and Syria. See State Sponsors of Terrorism, DEP’T OF STATE,
http://www.state.gov/j/ct/list/c14151.htm (last visited May 28, 2015). Cuba was also designated a state
sponsor of terrorism, but was recently removed in May 2015. Julie Hirschfeld Davis, U.S. Removes
Cuba from State-Sponsored Terrorism List, N.Y. TIMES (May 29, 2015).
111. See 15 C.F.R. § 740.9(b)(1)(i) (2013). Countries currently on this list include Burma,
People’s Republic of China, and Iraq. For a complete list see 15 C.F.R. § 740 Supp. No. 1 (2015).
112. See FERGUSSON, supra note 100, at 10.
113. See 15 C.F.R. § 744.
114. See FERGUSSON, supra note 100, at 8.
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Control Act (AECA). The Regulations are intended to control the “sale,
export, and re-transfer of defense services as an integral part of
safeguarding U.S. national security and furthering U.S. foreign policy
objectives.”115 Specifically, ITAR controls the export and import of
defense-related articles and services that are designated on the United
States Munitions List.116 And unlike the flexible license-based system
administered by the Department of Commerce, ITAR “allows for very
few license exceptions, and requires licenses issued pursuant to the
ITAR to include provisos as to the detail and extent of technical
information that can be shared or exchanged with non-U.S. persons,
irrespective of their nationality or domicile.”117
* * *
The compendium of laws discussed above demonstrates both the
depth and scope of the regulatory landscape controlling foreign
investment in the U.S. Indeed, the laws and regulations touch upon
every aspect of foreign investment affecting U.S. interests. More
importantly, the description above reveals how complicated the laws and
regulations are in this area, and how their current application sometimes
leads to undesirable results.
III. CRITIQUE OF THE CURRENT LAWS
The myriad laws and regulations outlined in the previous section are
open to a number of criticisms. In many ways, the laws are both overand under-inclusive, leading to arbitrary application and unfair results.
The following Part highlights several of these criticisms.
A. Arbitrary Application
The first and least justifiable characteristic of the current laws and
regulations is their inconsistent application. Arbitrary application can
result in uncertainty, which significantly impacts a company’s ability to
invest within a country.118 In this case, the arbitrary application of

115. U.S. DEPT. OF DEF., GETTING STARTED WITH DEFENSE TRADE (2012), available at
http://www.pmddtc.state.gov/documents/ddtc_getting_started.pdf.
116. 22 C.F.R. § 121.1 (2013). A number of countries are subject to U.S. arms embargos. See 22
C.F.R. § 126.1(c).
117. Dara Panahy, Bijan Ganji, Itar Reform: A Work in Progress, AIR & SPACE LAW., Dec. 2013,
at 7–8.
118. See, e.g., Lynda L. Butler, The Politics of Takings: Choosing the Appropriate
Decisionmaker, 38 WM. & MARY L. REV. 749, 765 (1997) (noting the deterrent impact of uncertainty on
investment as it relates to takings law); Willard K. Tom & Alexis J. Gilman, U.S. and E.C. Antitrust
Approaches to Patent Uncertainty, 34 LAW & POL'Y INT'L BUS. 859, 890 (2003) (noting deterrent
impact of uncertainty on investment in research and development with respect to patent laws).
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national security laws and regulations can create untenable uncertainty
for foreign companies seeking to invest within the United States. After
all, how can a foreign company accurately assess its chance of
successfully acquiring a U.S. company when precedential examples fail
to reach uniform results?
The Department of Transportation, for example, has strictly enforced
cabotage laws. This is especially true for the requirement that air
carriers be owned and operated by U.S. citizens. And even though the
statute carved out an emergency exception,119 that exception has been
interpreted narrowly. For example, the Department of Transportation
denied a request by a foreign carrier to fly stranded passengers in Puerto
Rico because there were “a sufficient number of non-certified air
carriers (air taxis) on Puerto Rico which could provide extra flights.”120
Based on this historical application of law alone, foreign investors
would sensibly avoid attempts to invest in air carriers. 121 However, the
occasional circumvention of the law can create uncertainty. Virgin
America, for instance, was granted a license to fly passengers and cargo
within the U.S.122 To do so, Virgin restructured its entire company to
make Virgin America an independent subsidiary; but even then, the
Department of Transportation contested Virgin America’s application.123
Only after 18 months of arduous negotiation and documented proof that
Virgin America was indeed substantially controlled by U.S. investors
did the Department of Transportation stipulate that Virgin America met
the citizenship requirement.124
119. Congress enacted the emergency exception in 1980. See International Air Transportation
Competition Act § 13, Pub. L. 96-192, 94 Stat. 35 (Feb. 15, 1980), repealed Pub. L. 103-272, 108 Stat.
745 (July 5, 1994).
120. Howard E. Kass, Cabotage and Control: Bringing 1938 U.S. Aviation Policy into the Jet
Age, 26 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 143, 158 (1994).
121. A number of foreign carriers avoid the cabotage laws by purchasing ownership stakes in
American air carriers below the statutory maximum of 25 percent. See Jeffrey Donner Brown, Foreign
Investment in U.S. Airlines: What Limits Should Be Placed on Foreign Ownership of U.S. Carriers?, 41
SYRACUSE L. REV. 1269, 1270 (1990) (listing a number of foreign airlines that own or are in the process
of acquiring “large stakes in U.S. carriers”).
122. See Katherine Hunt, Virgin America Receives Final OK From Transportation Dept.,
MARKET WATCH (May 18, 2007), http://www.marketwatch.com/story/virgin-america-receives-final-okfrom-transportation-dept. For nearly a decade, Virgin Atlantic Airways chairman Richard Branson
argued against U.S. cabotage laws and sought to start a low-cost interstate airline as early as 1998. See
Virgin
Stirs
U.S.
Cabotage
Debate,
FLIGHTGLOBAL.COM
(Nov.
1,
1998),
http://www.flightglobal.com/news/articles/virgin-stirs-us-cabotage-debate-44421/.
123. See Mark J. Andrews et al., International Transportation Law, 42 INT'L LAW. 631, 649-50
(2008).
124. See supra note 87-89 and accompanying text; Andrews et al., supra note 123, at 650-51. As
part of the agreement, Virgin America’s CEO, Fred Reid, agreed to step down from his post based on
the fact that Reid “might be beholden to foreign interests . . . because he was hired by British billionaire
Richard Branson, a part owner of the airline,” even though Reid worked in the airline industry for more
than 25 years for Delta Airlines and Lufthansa. See Eric Young, Virgin America CEO Reid Wins
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Inconsistency can also be observed in the operation of CFIUS. As the
gatekeeper to foreign investment in the United States, inconsistent
decision making by CFIUS creates uncertainty in the global market.
CFIUS’s impact is felt both in its actual recommendations to the
President, as well as its mere threat of action.125 Indeed, foreign
corporations have been surprised by the stiff resistance they have faced
when attempting to acquire U.S. companies.126 Even though foreign
corporations should always be prepared to face regulatory hurdles when
entering a foreign market, arbitrary results from the CFIUS review
process indicate that no amount of preparation can lead to predictable
results.
In contrast with CFIUS’s stiff resistant to CNOOC’s acquisition of
Unocal, the Committee permitted ARMZ, a Russian state-owned
company, to purchase a company that owns uranium mines in
Wyoming.127 The acquisition placed more than half of U.S. uranium
output in the hands of a foreign country, 128 and helped ARMZ become
one of the top five uranium miners in the world.129 In another recent
example, CFIUS approved Chinese company Shuanghui International
Holding’s purchase of Smithfield Foods, making Shuanghui the world’s
largest pork producer.130
Standing alone, neither of these approved transactions raises serious
questions regarding the legitimacy of CFIUS’s investigative role. But
when considered in connection with other transactions, such as
CNOOC’s bid for Unocal, foreign companies face the impossible task of
assessing whether their transactions will insight the scrutiny of CFIUS.
After all, there is no apparent unifying principle or defined reasoning
behind CFIUS’s decisions.
Further uncertainty is implicated when considering the statement by
Senator Debbie Stabenow, Chairman of the Senate’s Agriculture
Committee. Although Senator Stabenow did not consider Shuanghui’s
acquisition of Smithfield a significant threat to U.S. security interests,
she expressed concern with foreign companies one day owning a
Reprieve, SAN FRAN. BUS. TIMES (Sept. 19, 2007), http://www.bizjournals.com/sanfrancisco
/stories/2007/09/17/daily26.html.
125. See infra 62-73 and accompanying text.
126. See, e.g., White, infra note 137 (“But the sources said CNOOC Chairman Fu Chengyu and
other executives and directors were shocked by the intensity of the negative reaction from Congress and
by signals that the administration did not want to decide whether to accept or reject CNOOC's bid.”).
127. See Ed Crooks, Russians to Gain U.S. Uranium Foothold, FIN. TIMES (Dec. 5, 2010),
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/220fb72a-00b0-11e0-aa29-00144feab49a.html#axzz2kknUWEKx.
128. See id.
129. See AMRZ Takes Hold of Uranium One, WORLD NUCLEAR NEWS (June 9, 2010),
http://www.world-nuclear-news.org/C-ARMZ_takes_hold_of_Uranium_One-0906107.html
130. See Doug Palmer, U.S. Approves Chinese Company’s Purchase of Smithfield, POLITICO
(Sept. 9, 2013), http://www.politico.com/story/2013/09/us-china-smithfield-96399.html.
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substantial portion of the U.S. food supply. 131 This suggests that
subsequent foreign companies seeking to acquire agricultural businesses
within the U.S. cannot rely on Shuanghui’s purchase of Smithfield as
precedent, as the future acquisition may finally trigger concern over the
cumulative foreign investment in the U.S. food supply.
B. Political Motivation
Politically motivated actors play significant roles in almost all foreign
investment decisions in the United States. CFIUS, for example, is
comprised of Presidential-appointed cabinet officials.132 Political
motivation not only adds another layer of uncertainty to foreign
companies’ investment decisions, but it also creates an unfair and
uncompetitive marketplace. CNOOC’s failed acquisition of Unocal is a
glaring example of political motivation in national security decisions
related to foreign investment.
At the time of CNOOC’s attempted acquisition of Unocal, Congress
was in the midst of an ongoing battle with China over the appreciation
of the Chinese yuan.133 There was also growing resentment within the
U.S. over the outsourcing of American jobs to China and other
developing nations.134 Although unrelated in fact, these overlapping
issues between China and the U.S. ostensibly impacted the outcome of
CNOOC’s bid for Unocal. Thus, although CNOOC’s interest in Unocal
was purely economic,135 these unrelated economic and political issues
ostensibly impacted the outcome of CNOOC’s bid for Unocal.
The party set to benefit most from CNOOC withdrawing its bid to
acquire Unocal was Chevron, another corporation that was poised to
acquire Unocal.136 It may come as no surprise then that members of

131. Id. (“China or other countries [may] seek to purchase our largest poultry, or dairy, or corn
producers next[.]”).
132. See supra note 48–49.
133. See Peter S. Goodman, China Resists U.S. Pressure On Textiles, Currency, WASH. POST
(May
28,
2005),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2005/05/27/AR2005052701347.html; China’s Yuan Under Fresh Pressure, BBC
NEWS (May 6, 2005), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/4521969.stm.
134. The resentment of U.S. job loss even caused CNOOC to pledge to protect substantially all
U.S. jobs if it successfully acquired Unocal. See Loretta Ng & Wing-Gar Cheng, CNOOC Pledges to
Protect
U.S.
Jobs
in
Unocal
Takeover,
BLOOMBERG
(June
24,
2005),
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=agGmCkuvR_1U&refer=asia.
135. See Is CNOOC’s Bid for Unocal a Threat to America?, THE WARTON SCH., U. PENN. (Nov.
21, 2005), http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article/is-cnoocs-bid-for-unocal-a-threat-to-america/
(noting that CNOOC’s interest in Unocal stemmed from Unocal’s presence in Asia which would have
made capitalizing on Unocal’s assets easier for CNOOC than non-Asian purchasers).
136. See Barboza & Sorkin, supra note 63.
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Congress were heavily lobbied by Chevron at the time.137 Indeed,
Chevron is one of the largest corporate political contributors in the U.S.,
spending more than $4 million on campaign contributions and over $9.5
million on lobbying in 2012.138 Ultimately, Chevron was able to acquire
Unocal for $1.5 billion less than CNOOC was offering based primarily
on accusations that CNOOC’s acquisition of Unocal would monopolize
the U.S. oil supply. In reality, however, U.S. interest in oil was largely
secure as Unocal accounted for only 0.2 percent of global oil production
and less than 1 percent of U.S. domestic consumption.139
Denying foreign investments like CNOOC’s based on largely
political reasons can also have more wide-reaching repercussions.
Foreign relations with the acquiring company’s home country could be
negatively impacted. As noted above, the U.S. was attempting to
convince China to appreciate the value of the yuan at the time of
CNOOC’s bid for Unocal.140 By precluding a Chinese company from
entering the U.S. market, negotiations with China’s government over
broader economic or social issues may be blunted. Further, China is an
industrializing nation and stymieing one acquisition will not prevent
Chinese companies from seeking natural resources elsewhere. Quite the
contrary, by preventing China from acquiring U.S. oil companies, it
increases “China’s interest in making energy deals with nations that
Washington considers dangerous rogue states, such as Iran and
Sudan.”141 Indeed, Iran is currently the third largest supplier of crude oil
to China.142
C. Privatization of National Security
Today, a number of industries related to national security have been
privatized. In many ways, this could simply be a product of necessity.
There are, after all, more than 480,000 government contractors and an
estimated five million Americans with access to some classified
137. See Ben White, Chinese Drop Bid to Buy U.S. Oil Firm, WASH. POST (Aug. 3, 2005),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/08/02/AR2005080200404.html; see also
Barboza & Sorkin, supra note 63 (“Of course, the day CNOOC announced its offer, the reaction began.
Chevron’s lobbyists worked their political base in California.”).
138. See Chevron, OPENSECRETS.ORG, http://www.opensecrets.org/orgs/summary.php?id
=D000000015 (last visited May 28, 2015).
139. See HUFBAUER ET AL., supra note 71, at 50–51.
140. See supra note 133 and accompanying text.
141. White, supra note 137.
142. See Randy Gener, China and Iran Negotiate $20 Billion Deal Despite US Nuke-Related
Sanctions, JOURNALIST (Nov. 4, 2013), http://thejournalist.ie/international-news/china-and-irannegotiate-deal/; Jason Rezaian, Iran Looks to Oil to Ease the Pressure of Economic Sanctions, THE
GUARDIAN (Nov. 5, 2013), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/nov/05/iran-oil-tehran-energysanctions.
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government information.143 In 2005, the value of private contracts
related to intelligence was approximately $42 billion.144
Simultaneously, regulations have excluded foreign competition from
many of these newly privatized industries. This is disconcerting and apt
for criticism in two respects.
First, privatization of national security jobs is not necessarily a
desirable objective. Indeed, in many cases it has led to less than
desirable outcomes. Take, for example, government background checks
that are required for any contractors that have access to classified
information. Although the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) is
in charge of the overwhelming majority of background checks, OPM
outsources most of them to private contractors.145 At one point, a single
private contract, USIS, conducts 65% of all U.S. background checks and
was paid more than $200 million by OPM.146 Therefore, not only is the
U.S. government privatizing defense work, but the employees
responsible for running the background checks of those private
employees are also private.147
Of course, advocates of privatization may reflect positively on the
shift of national security jobs from the public to the private sector.
However, a closer look at recent scandals, such as that involving
Edward Snowden, exemplify why privatization is not always beneficial.
For one, private companies have obligations to shareholders, which can
create perverse incentives when completing government contracts.
USIS, for example, is currently being sued by the Department of Justice
for “churning out incomplete background checks to hit revenue
targets.”148 Employees of USIS have commented that the company
143. See Peter Weber, Edward Snowden and America’s Security-Clearance Vetting Problem, THE
WEEK (June 21, 2013), http://theweek.com/article/index/245967/edward-snowden-and-americassecurity-clearance-vetting-problem.
144. See Aubrey Bloomfield, Booz Allen Hamilton: 70% of the U.S. Intelligence Budget Goes to
Private Contractors, POLICYMIC (June 14, 2013), http://www.policymic.com/articles/48845/booz-allenhamilton-70-of-the-u-s-intelligence-budget-goes-to-private-contractors.
145. The OPM has a budget of $1 billion dollars to conduct background checks. See David
Francis, Here’s How Edward Snowden Got ‘Top Secret’ Clearance, FISCAL TIMES (June 21, 2013),
http://www.thefiscaltimes.com/Articles/2013/06/21/Heres-How-Edward-Snowden-Got-Top-SecretClearance.
146. Id.
147. After cyber-attack on USIS’s databases which potentially exposes thousands of employee
records, decided not to renew its contracts with USIS. Senator Jon Tester noted that the termination of
those contracts was a “welcome sign that the federal government is finally beginning to hold contractors
accountable for taking millions in federal money and then failing to get the job done for the taxpayer.”
Christian Davenport, USIS Contracts for Federal Background Security Checks Won’t be Renewed,
WASH. POST (Sept. 9, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/opm-to-end-usiscontracts-for-background-security-checks/2014/09/09/4fcd490a-3880-11e4-9c9febb47272e40e_story.html.
148. See Christian Davenport, USIS Fires Manager for Pressuring Employees to Work Overtime
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would give them “impossible workloads and unrelenting deadlines.”149
Of course, this is not to suggest that public employees are error proof.
However, government employees do not face the same pressure from
shareholders to reduce costs and increase profits.
Second, by systematically excluding foreign competitors, those
industries can suffer from inflated prices and less innovation. The Jones
Act, for example, prevents foreign-made ships from carrying cargo
between two U.S. ports.150 Arguably, this has increased the price of
cargo shipping in the U.S., while also reducing innovation within the
industry.151 A 1999 study by the U.S. International Trade Commission
estimated that the “economy-wide effect of removing the Jones Act is a
U.S. economic welfare gain of approximately $1.32 billion.”152 Even
partial liberalization of the Jones Act (repealing the U.S.-build
requirement) would result in significant economic gain.153
IV. A MULTI-PRONG SOLUTION
The patchwork of laws and regulations described above are intended
to protect U.S. interests from foreign threats.
However, their
unpredictable and unfair application have stifled foreign investment and
have untold negative consequences on foreign relations. A single
statutory scheme is an unlikely solution because the myriad laws and
regulations aim to protect U.S. interests in different ways. While CFIUS
aims to prevent or permit the wholesale admittance of foreign
companies into the U.S. market, the NISP regulations only seek to
prevent foreign companies operating within the U.S. from accessing
classified information. Other laws discussed earlier operate to prohibit
foreign companies completely from specific industries or product
Without Pay, WASH. POST (Mar. 7, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/usisfires-manager-for-pressuring-employees-to-work-overtime-without-pay/2014/03/07/2f20906e-a63f11e3-9cff-b1406de784f0_story.html. USIS has since declared bankruptcy, and the U.S. government
among others, continue to pursue their claims in the bankruptcy court. Christian Davenport, DOJ Wants
USIS Parent Company to Pay Damages Despite Bankruptcy Filing, WASH. POST (June 22, 2015),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/doj-wants-usis-parent-company-to-pay-damagesdespite-bankruptcy-filing/2015/06/22/33008434-18f6-11e5-93b7-5eddc056ad8a_story.html.
149. Id.
150. See Oyedemi, supra note 81.
151. See, e.g., William H. Yost III, Jonesing for A Taste of Competition: Why an Antiquated
Maritime Law Needs Reform, 18 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 52, 62 (2013).
152. U.S. INT’L TRADE COMM., THE ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF SIGNIFICANT U.S. IMPORT
RESTRAINTS 98 (1999).
153. Id. at 99–100. As pointed out in an earlier study, Alaska and Hawaii are effected most by the
Jones Act requirements. The cost of the U.S. build requirement on Alaska alone was estimated to be
between $134 million and $456 million per year. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE,
GAO/RCED-88-107, THE JONES ACT: IMPACT ON ALASKA TRANSPORTATION AND U.S. MILITARY
SEALIFT CAPABILITY 3 (1988).
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categories.
Because these laws aim to accomplish a diverse set of goals, a multiprong solution is necessary. The first step is to repeal cabotage laws that
prevent foreign competition. These anachronistic laws do little for the
air and water transportation industries except increase costs and reduce
innovation. Any national security interests that the government has in
those industries could be protected through properly scrutinizing foreign
companies seeking to enter those markets. Second, instead of relying on
a politically motivated governing body, CFIUS should be replaced with
an independent review board. This independent governing body would
operate much like CFIUS does today; however, its independence would
ensure that foreign transactions are reviewed without a political cloud
overhanging the decision-making process. Lastly, because background
checks play an important gatekeeper function in every foreign and
domestic transaction involving classified information, those checks
should be completed by properly trained and vetted government
employees. This would not only increase accountability in the process,
but also ensure that potential issues are discovered before classified
information is divulged.
A. Deregulating Industries
Despite the outdated functions of cabotage laws, the government has
failed to make any concerted efforts to repeal them. Ultimately, the lack
of competition has resulted in monopolies in those protected industries,
which detrimentally impacts U.S. competitiveness domestically and
globally. These industries should be opened to any foreign competitors
who pass an initial review process.
Congress initially passed the Jones Act and the Federal Aviation Act
in the wake of World War I and the Cold War, respectively. The
primary justification of both Acts was to ensure that the U.S. had
sufficient air and water transportation during times of war. But other
wartime provisions have long since been repealed.154 And although
future armed conflict may necessitate massive air and water fleets,
preventing foreign competitors from operating air and water transport
based on an unlikely future armed conflict is unwise. Indeed, foreign
competitors already operate within the U.S. air industry in substance, if
not in form.155
Nothing is more convincing for the need to repeal cabotage laws than
154. See generally Lowell Turrentine & Sam D. Thurman, Jr., Wartime Federal Legislation, 34
CAL. L. REV. 277 (discussing a number of wartime provisions that were repealed after World War II in
the realms of taxation, war production, price control, labor, etc.).
155. See supra note 122-124 and accompanying text.
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the negative impact the laws have had on U.S. competitors globally.
Because cabotage laws have effectively insulated U.S. carriers from
foreign completion, U.S. companies operating air and water fleets have
had no incentive to develop, experiment, or upgrade their fleets. This is
evident when comparing the success of U.S.-flagged container ships to
that of foreign-flagged ships. In 2000, the U.S. only had 2,990
deadweight tons on container ships compared to the rest of the world’s
63,967 deadweight tons.156 As a result, although U.S. corporations
operating within the industry may have reaped short-term gains from
monopolies on the market, the long-term opportunities within those
industries have floundered.
This is far from a novel proposal. In the early 1990s when several
major U.S. airlines faced significant financial losses, Kenneth Mead,
Director of Transportation Issues in the General Accounting Office,
emphatically recommended a four-prong solution to domestic airlines’
troubles.157 In addition to assessing pricing practices and increasing
access to foreign markets, Director Mead suggested allowing foreign
competitors to invest in domestic carriers as well as reduce the barriers
to competition domestically.158
B. Independent Review Board
Like all significant foreign investments in the U.S., foreign
investments in newly deregulated industries would be required to
undergo a thorough review process to ensure U.S. interests are
protected. CFIUS should be replaced, however, with an independent
review board to ensure fairness and non-political decisions. Currently,
CFIUS is comprised of 16 members—all heads of executive-branch
agencies.159 Agency heads are political appointees of the president,
meaning that CFIUS members are at the very least likely to harbor some
degree of political motivation. In addition, the level of influence the
President has on any one member is impossible to determine, just as is
the level of influence Congress has on the President or individual

156. KATHLEEN MAGEE, U.S. CABOTAGE LAWS: PROTECTIVE OR DAMAGING 55 (2002), nonpaginated copy available at http://www.commercialdiplomacy.org/ma_projects/magee1.htm.
157. Financial Condition of the Airline Industry: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on Aviation of
the H. Comm. on Pub. Works and Transportation, 103d Cong. 263–67 (1993) (statement of Kenneth M.
Mead, Director, Transportation Issues, Resources, Community and Economic Development Division,
General Accounting Office).
158. Id. at 264. Director Mead recognized that there were several concerns with opening
domestic markets to foreign competitors, including national security and economic concerns. However,
Director Mead suggests that these problems can be addressed with existing antitrust and immigration
laws. See id. at 265.
159. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
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CFIUS members.
The establishment of an independent board to review foreign
transactions would not only benefit the national interests of the U.S., but
also further the goals of the free market system. Of course, absolute
independence is difficult, if not impossible to obtain. In our two-party
democracy, though, a review board comprised of representatives that are
not political appointees of either party would at least be more likely to
be independent and impartial. Indeed, the Congressional Budget Office
(CBO) could serve as a model for any future change.
The CBO is a nonpartisan organization that produces “independent
analyses of budgetary and economic issues to support the Congressional
budget process.”160 Each CBO employee is appointed based on
professional accomplishment rather than political affiliation. Further,
the CBO Director is appointed jointly by the Speaker of the House and
the President pro tempore of the Senate only after hearing
recommendations from both the House and Senate budget
committees.161 The CBO has enjoyed a good reputation since its
creation in 1975, and has been able to retain that reputation by
remaining nonpartisan and never shying away from voicing an
unpopular opinion.162
An independent review board similar to the CBO would ensure that
investigations into significant foreign transactions are fair and impartial.
Further, the independent review would be able to present its findings to
the president and make recommendations based on that information
absent political motivations. Of course, agency heads would still play a
crucial role in the process. After all, heads of the Departments of
Defense and Energy, for example, may have vital information that is
crucial in making a decision. However, agency heads can present that
information directly to the independent review board, which would then
compile and analyze the input from all relevant agencies before making
its ultimate recommendation. This way, the relevant information can
still make its way into the decision-making process while ensuring any
political or ulterior motives do not.
160. Overview, CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, http://www.cbo.gov/about/overview (last visited May 28,
2015).
161. Our Organization and People, CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, http://www.cbo.gov/about/ourorganization-and-people (last visited May 28, 2015).
162. See PHILLIP G. JOYCE, THE CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE: HONEST NUMBERS, POWER,
AND POLICYMAKING 56 (2011) (noting that by 1980, the CBO “challenged both a Republican and a
Democratic president, and was beginning to be regarded as perhaps the most credible source on fiscal
matters in Washington”); Suzy Khimm, Why Does Anyone Trust the CBO?, WASH. POST (July 28,
2011),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/post/why-does-anyone-trust-thecbo/2011/07/27/gIQARUVfeI_blog.html (CBO directors . . . have managed to retain the agency’s
reputation for nonpartisan analysis — in part by demonstrating their willingness to put forward
inconvenient truths to the very party that appointed them.”).
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C. Deprivatizing Background Checks
Any changes to the current laws and regulations would be incomplete
without reforming the way background checks are completed.
Background checks play a critical gatekeeping role with respect to
classified information. For even if a foreign corporation insidiously
acquires a strategic U.S. corporation, a properly completed background
check would ensure that classified information stays out of hands of its
employees.
Even though the majority of background checks are completed by
private companies,163 the entire process is overseen by the Office of
Personnel Management (OPM). Therefore, as private companies come
under increased scrutiny for critical failures, recognizing that the failure
is just as much a failure of government oversight as it is of the private
sector is important. Indeed, the one-billion dollar fund that OPM uses
for background checks has never been audited,164 so the true extent of
wastefulness is still unknown. By requiring OPM to internally complete
all background checks, the government can increase accountability
while potentially reducing costs.
There are currently several private contractors performing
background checks on behalf of OPM. OPM’s delegation to private
contractors, however, disperses responsibility for successfully
completing background checks across the public and private sectors.
Thus, when critical failures occur, it is difficult to determine where to
lay the blame. Further, it may promote blame-shifting from one entity
to another. Shortly after the Washington Navy Yard shooting, for
example, a congressional investigation showed that USIS failed to
conduct a proper background check of the shooter, even though USIS
subsequently tried to deflect blame onto OPM.165
Blame-shifting can be avoided by requiring OPM to internally
complete all background checks. This would increase accountability by
concentrating all responsibility to OPM rather than spreading it across
the public and private sectors. Although this would require an
expansion of OPM’s workforce, the proposal is not without support.
For one, USIS originated as the investigative branch of OPM. It was not
until 1996 that USIS “was outsourced during a wave of privatizations of
federal government services.”166 Having OPM internally complete

163. See supra notes 145–146 and accompanying text.
164. See Francis, supra note 145.
165. See STAFF OF H.R. COMM. ON OVERSIGHT AND GOV’T REFORM, 113TH CONG.,
CONTRACTING OUT SECURITY CLEARANCE INVESTIGATIONS: THE ROLE OF USIS AND ALLEGATIONS OF
SYSTEMIC FRAUD 7 (Comm. Print 2014).
166. Id. at 3–4.
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background checks would therefore only represent a policy shift back to
the way things were. There even appears to be a move in that direction
already. OPM’s current director has indicated a shift in policy such that
“only federal employees will perform final reviews of background
investigations.”167
In addition to increasing organizational accountability, the
government may be able to reduce costs by creating economies of scale.
Instead of contracting with several different private contractors, the
OPM would internally complete all background checks. All else being
equal, this would result in cheaper background checks, because an
increase in the number of units created reduces the per-unit cost.168 That
is, the more background checks the OPM does, the cheaper each
background check should become. While OPM’s director suggested
that the private sector can complete background checks more efficiently
than the government, no one has ever completed a cost-benefit analysis
to support this assertion.169
V. CONCLUSION
Relying on a patchwork of laws and regulations to prevent foreign
threats domestically clearly has its shortcomings. From background
checks to government review, these laws, while well-intentioned, are
either anachronistic or ineffective. Private corporations in charge of
completing background checks have failed in several critical respects,
and review procedures that are supposed to be impartial are oftentimes
politically motivated. This has all culminated in a chill on foreign
investment. Further, laws completely banning foreign investors from
particular U.S. industries are grounded in wartime reasoning and stifle
competition and innovation.
A new approach is necessary—one that allows the U.S. to benefit
from foreign investment while also continuing to protect U.S. interests
from foreign threats. Ultimately, the multi-prong solution advocated in
this paper does just that. Deregulating certain U.S. industries ensures
new investment in otherwise stale industries. Furthermore, instituting
167. Id. at 12.
168. See Aubrey Silberston, Economies of Scale in Theory and Practice, 82 ECON. J. 369, 369
(1972) (“Classic economies of scale relate to the effect on average costs of production of different rates
of output, per unit of time, of a given commodity, when all possible adaptations have been carried out to
make production at each scale as efficient as possible.”).
169. See Francis, supra note 145. Even if internally completing background checks does not
realize cost savings, this may be viewed as an acceptable cost based on the importance of background
checks. After all, the recent critical failures demonstrate that the cost of critical errors is grave. The
cost of increasing accountability can thus be viewed as counterbalancing the increase in cost.
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an independent review board modeled after the CBO makes an impartial
review process more likely. Finally, because background checks serve
as the backbone to any national security plan, the OPM should complete
them internally, resulting in increased accountability and potentially
reduced costs. While some of these recommended changes are modest,
others are concededly more substantial. However, this multi-prong
solution ensures the security of our while also staying current with the
trends of the global marketplace.
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